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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [Redacted] Report

1. Enclosed is a [Redacted] report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword [Redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [Redacted] is classified [Redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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[Redacted]

William W. Wells

[Redacted]


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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR, Poland, German Democratic Republic, [redacted]
Czechoslovakia

DATE OF INFO. June 1977

DATE 8 November 1977

SUBJECT

Critique of Exercise "ZACHOD [WEST]-77" and
"FALA [WAVE]-77"

SOURCE Documentary


SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish document classified SECRET entitled Conclusions From Exercises "ZACHOD [WEST]-77" and "FALA [WAVE]-77". This document is a comprehensive summary of the highlights and shortcomings of Polish participation in the two exercises. "FALA-77" was a sea-borne continuation of "ZACHOD-77" with extensive participation of the Baltic Fleet in episodes simulating offensive actions against Denmark and Norway, including amphibious landings. Primarily command and staff exercises designed to evaluate coordination and command procedures of the multi-national Combined Armed Forces Staff and related national components, the episodes were played out by sizeable representative Soviet, Polish, GDR, and Czechoslovak forces. Numerous criticisms are made of naval and amphibious operations troop movement procedures, air and antiaircraft defense and support actions, and the swamping of staff activities with paperwork.

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
Conclusions Drawn from Exercise
"ZACHOD [WEST]-77" and
"FALA [WAVE]-77"

From 31 May to 9 June 1977, under the direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union USTINOV, strategic-operational exercise "ZACHOD-77" was conducted on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Polish People's Republic (PPR), The Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (SR Cz) and the western part of the USSR, with participation from the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) of the operations group of Command Post-1 of the Ministry of National Defense, commands and staffs of the Front, air army, navy, wartime military districts, and elements of the troop movement control system; and from 27 June to 7 July 1977, operational-tactical exercise "FALA-77" was conducted in the northern part of the GDR and PPR, under the direction of Marshall of the Soviet Union KULIKOV, with participation from the PAF of: naval commands, staffs and flotillas, and operations groups of commands and staffs of the Front (Pomeranian Military District), 6th Airborne Division, 7th Assault Landing Division, Air Army, 3rd Assault-Reconnaissance Aviation Division, 4th Fighter Aviation Division, 2nd National Air Defense Corps, three combined command posts, and detached forces and means from all branches of the armed forces. For the exercise, the PAF fielded a total of approximately 21,500 troops, 80 combat vehicles, 3,700 motor vehicles, 200 aircraft and helicopters, and 50 ships.

Both exercises were the most important undertakings of 1977, and were based on strategic-operational backgrounds constituting possible options for deploying forces, repulsing an enemy attack, and for change over to offensive operations in situations demanding immediate changes in the prepared operational plans.

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In addition, exercise "ZACHOD-77" was characterized by the tremendous expanse of space involved, encompassing the entire Western Theater of Military Operations, in which, for strategic operations, the "East" forces simulated deployment of forces and means of six fronts (four of them, including the 1st Front of the PAF, were committed to battle during the war), three independent combined arms armies, one army corps, allied fleets operating in the Baltic Sea, two armies of strategic rocket troops, long range and transport aviation, and air defense aviation of the allied countries. Actual participants in the exercise included commands and staffs of five fronts (three of the Soviet Army, one of the PAF and one of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces), three independent combined arms armies (Northern Group of Soviet Forces, Central Group of Soviet Armed Forces, National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic (NPA GDR), one army corps (NPA GDR), allied fleets in the Baltic Sea, operations groups of the general staffs of the Polish and Czechoslovak Armed Forces, and the main staff of the NPA GDR. In both exercises, the allied fleets were incorporated into the composition of the Combined Baltic Fleets, formed ad hoc, command of which was exercised by a staff assigned from the Baltic Fleet of the USSR. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in addition to being the control staff, also acted as the Supreme Command in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

The theme of exercise "ZACHOD-77" was operational deployment of forces in a theater of operations, repelling an enemy attack in a border battle, change over to a strategic offensive operation, commitment to battle of reserves, and development of a favorable situation under conditions of nuclear war. The theme of exercise "FALA-77" was preparation and conduct of offensive front operations on the Jutland and the northern-coastal operational axis in order to destroy, jointly with the allied fleets of the Baltic Sea, groupings of enemy land and sea forces, and occupation of the Danish Straits zone and the south-eastern shores of Norway. The front detached from the PAF, became a part of the composition

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
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of three/four combined arms armies (in "ZACHOD-77" - three Polish and one Soviet armies; in "FALA-77" - one Polish and two Soviet armies), a GDR army corps, an air army, as well as other combined arms and front large tactical units. The task of the front was to prepare and conduct offensive operations on the northern-coastal and Jutland operational axis, preceded by operations intended to repulse an enemy attack. In exercise "ZACHOD-77," the front executed the main thrust along the Jutland Peninsula, committing on this axis an army of the operational second echelon. On the fourth day of operations (war) the front made an assault landing on Danish islands, the assault force consisting of three-four divisions and one naval infantry regiment (a mixed grouping composed of PPR, GDR and USSR units). The depth of the initial offensive operations of the army was from 350 to 450 kilometers; and in offensive operations of the front in exercise "ZACHOD-77", it was 800 kilometers. In exercise "FALA-77", the front was not given a subsequent mission on the northern-coastal operational axis. The subsequent task of the front was successive assault landing operations and occupation of the south-eastern coast of Norway. After occupying the Danish Islands and the Jutland Peninsula, 5 to 6 days were allotted for executing this task. The proposed rate of offensive operations, while executing the initial tasks of the army, was from 35 to 50 kilometers per day; and for subsequent tasks, from 50 to 60 kilometers per day. In executing the subsequent front task in exercise "ZACHOD-77", a rate of 70 kilometers per 24 hours was attained.

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


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Exercise "ZACHOD-77" was of unprecedented importance to training--taking into consideration the actual commitment, for the first time, of central military institutions of the PPR, SRCz, and GDR, and the large numbers of higher allied staffs, as well as the solution of problems on an unparalleled scale (for example, comprehensive support of the regrouping and deployment of forces, ensuring the military functioning of the state under war conditions, and so forth). Whereas, exercise "FALA-77" was, as if, a confirmation (repetition) of the preceding undertaking on a scale narrowed to operations performed on the northern strategic axis. Initially conceived as a typical naval undertaking and having as an objective--true to form--improvement, primarily, of commands and staffs of the allied fleets, the exercise was transformed into a typical front exercise for which events at sea constituted only a background and the staffs of the allied fleets became organs for the practical solution of coordination problems. The staff of the front became the operations coordinating center. On this staff rested the entire responsibility for organizing all combined undertakings carried out within the scope of the combat operations encompassed in the intentions of the exercises, except for certain narrow-specialized tasks performed independently by the Combined Baltic Fleet.

According to an evaluation conducted by the exercise command, our commands and staffs carried out the tasks assigned to them in a satisfactory manner, and--as was emphasized in the critique of exercise "FALA-77"--the causes of the majority of shortcomings revealed in exercise "ZACHOD-77" were promptly corrected during the preparatory period for exercise "FALA-77".

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On the other hand, the troops which participated in exercise "FALA-77", in many practical episodes carried out their assignments in an exemplary manner. Of the total of 87 tasks of this kind, units of the PAF fulfilled independently or jointly 44, receiving evaluations "very good" for all of them, except for one which was "good" (submarine torpedo fire on a target afloat). The allied forces also fulfilled their tasks receiving ratings "very good" and "good" and one "satisfactory" (bomb attack of a TU-16 aircraft on a target afloat). During the assault landing, the best organized operations were those of the units of the PAF. Of course, these evaluations should be viewed with critical caution, since all the tasks were repeatedly practiced within the framework of preparatory undertakings. Nevertheless, from the point of view of competition, the conditions for the practical exercises were the same for all participants.

1. The operations group of Command Post-1 of the Ministry of National Defense was assigned the following tasks:

- to support the movement of and commit to battle our front, and to organize its medical support and the replacement of troops, equipment, and material-technical means;

- to support the movement of forces of the Soviet fronts through Polish territory;

- to organize the protection and maintenance of transportation, and the security of the most important installations on the national territory.

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Tasks defined by the exercise command for the operations group of the Command Post of the Ministry of National Defense were restricted and, as a rule, pertained to military problem areas. This kind of treatment of the operation of the Command post does not provide a complete basis for testing the efficiency of the performance of the operations group in solving all tasks assigned to it. The basic problem, namely, definition of the role of the General Staff of the PAF in solving problems within the coalition defense system, remained partially unresolved. Limiting the role of the participating operations group to that of an organ supporting needs resulting from the regrouping of allied forces, left many problems without solutions. It is now apparent, that the General Staff of the PAF will have to devote much more attention to the matter of rendering support to regrouping forces than anticipated. This may make it necessary to re-evaluate the tasks and to introduce essential corrections into the organization of work in the central elements of the Ministry of National Defense (Command Post) formed in time of war, particularly in the operational chain of command, and in the staffs of the military districts. The events of the exercise also revealed that the General Staff of the PAF will have to devote much more attention to the problems of the external front. According to the evaluations of the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces, it is not enough just to support the regrouping of the forces making up the complement of the external front and the replacement of men and equipment. Party-political influence during the battle was also considered inadequate. The General Staff of the PAF should be well informed on all tasks performed by forces of the front in an actual situation, and also on plans for fulfilling those tasks. Setting up the problem in this manner will require, in the future, a more precise system for informing the Command Post of the Ministry of National Defense by the Supreme Command of tasks assigned to the front and more efficient reporting to the Chief of the General Staff of the PAF by the front on decisions made and

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on operational plans. This requirement will certainly burden the front with the task of preparing an additional set of planning and reporting documents. Also, in order to make dissemination of information more efficient, it is necessary to have a group of officers from the PAF General Staff representing various specialties at the front headquarters.

The operations group of Command Post-1 of the Ministry of National Defense, the core of which were the cadre of the General Staff of the PAF, as far as numerical strength and organizational structure was concerned, in principle, met the requirements levied on it during the exercise. Under conditions requiring implementation of the entire range of tasks, it would be necessary to strengthen the operations element in particular. In view of the fact that this group worked together for the first time in the exercise, staff procedures were worked out as the exercise progressed, in practice. *

All of this leads to the conclusion that exercise "ZACHOD-77"--even though very instructional, especially from the point of view of the potential for realistic organization of coordination with appropriate command posts of the GDR, the SRCz, and the staffs of the front--did not furnish satisfactory answers for all matters pertaining to the position and tasks of the Command Post of the Ministry of National Defense in relation to the external front, as well as to interrelations with appropriate organs of the Supreme Command. Therefore, it will be necessary for the General Staff of the PAF to undertake further studies and, subsequently, to make specific organizational and training decisions.

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Even though the movement control system for our own and allied forces, which was deployed on a limited scale during the exercise, did not offer an opportunity for the full evaluation of its operating efficiency (in reality, only four routes were utilized for the regrouping of the Soviet Army staffs, and not all of the elements of this system, organized on the basis of joint plans for the regrouping of Soviet units, were deployed), nevertheless, it was possible to evaluate its basic concepts as passing the test. According to reports received from the regrouping commanders, staffs, and their representatives with the operations group of Command Post-1 of the Ministry of National Defense, the operating efficiency of the elements deployed was faultless. In fact, it was asserted that the degree of support given to the movement of the Soviet staffs surpassed their expectations. The team of officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) present at Command Post-1 of the Ministry of National Defense, and the assigned local organs of the People's Militia (provincial headquarters, police stations, and posts) posted along the march route of the forces were of considerable assistance to the effective functioning of the troop movement control system. From the analysis of the functioning of the system, it is evident that the presence of appropriate teams of MIA officers at troop movement control groups of the districts is necessary. The comrades from the Ministry of Internal Affairs are of the same opinion. A formal solution of this problem will present no difficulties.

While the support of regrouping of the ground forces was carried out properly, regrouping (rebasement) of the air armies which were a part of the Soviet fronts proved to be a most difficult problem. During the course of the exercise, the representatives of the commands of those armies requested assignment of a considerable number of additional airfields, refueling of the aircraft that were landing, and replenishment of fighter aviation ammunition. Our airfields were unprepared, in most cases, to fulfil these unexpected tasks. It is advisable to coordinate this problem with the Soviet comrades in the course of further collaboration on operational matters.

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The enacted problems of supporting the regrouping, and particularly the problem of anti-aircraft defense of the regrouping forces, revealed a need to standardize the discrepancies which emerged in the rules for coordinating the anti-aircraft defense troops and the National Air Defense Forces. In accordance with the scenario, the regrouping anti-aircraft defense troops of our front established and maintained coordination with the National Air Defense Forces within the combined command post system; whereas the Soviet forces established it with the corps command post and the central command post system (at the corps command posts, there were representatives of the chief of army anti-aircraft defense; whereas at the central command post of the National Air Defense Forces, there were representatives of the front). For this reason the General Staff of the PAF, in coordination with the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, will undertake appropriate work in order to standardize these rules. The ultimate goal is to ensure the capability to establish and maintain coordination with all the air defense means actually present in the national territory.

2. In both exercises, both the tasks of the front and the axes of the enacted operation were typical and should not have been a surprise to the participants. However, the exceptional scale of exercise "ZACHOD-77" and all the resulting actual interrelations of the front with the other units participating in the strategic offensive operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations brought the scenario considerably closer to possible realities, and caused the front to perform tasks within a new, more complicated context. During exercise "FALA-77", after overcoming difficulties related mostly to the altered scope of duties for some of the cadre, the staff of the front took part in the operations in a well organized manner. Learning from the results of the preceding exercise, the command and staff of the military district, accomplished in a short time an enormous training and organization task. The command and the staff of the front encountered no major difficulties in solving operational problems, making and working up decisions for offensive operations, forming strike groups, planning the employment of nuclear weapons and aviation, and in organizing the control, coordination, and support of combat operations.

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However, it will be necessary to devote a greater training effort to the organization of repelling an enemy attack. In this phase of the battle, there was a need to improve proficiency in applying aggressive forms of action, particularly, in planning artillery-air counterpreparation and offensive maneuvers on axes on which the front would be assured superiority. The organization of antitank defense and camouflage also requires improved skills. This, no doubt, is the result, among other things, of the fact that this subject was not covered thoroughly during previous training practices, counting on the slight possibility of our ground forces occupying operations assembly areas in direct contact with the enemy before the outbreak of hostilities and, thus, of the necessity to organize the repelling of enemy aggression in a border battle.

3. At the headquarters of the air army, no real difficulties were encountered in organizing the support of the combat operations of the front forces. However, it will be necessary to improve further the organization and conduct of the battle for air superiority, particularly methods of utilizing fighter aviation for carrying out combat missions against more decisive targets rather than just providing cover for the troops. Also, more attention should be devoted in the air force to planning the suppression of anti-aircraft defense primarily by improving proficiency in specific allocation of forces in order to deliver strikes against individual targets.

Taking into consideration the nature of possible military operations in the coalition system, in conformity with the unified concept of the superior commander, it is necessary to modernize the rules for coordination in accordance with the provisions of the "Instruction for organizing the coordination of operational aviation with the ground forces" (prepared by the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries).

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
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4. The naval staff correctly organized the operations of subordinate forces in the assault landing operations, in operations for gaining and maintaining superiority on the sea in the western part of the Baltic, and in its zone of responsibility. The exercise showed--independently of solutions adopted by the Staff of the Combined Baltic Fleets-- that shifting combat operations to the Danish Straits area is focused on two axes - the Baelt and the Sund. This makes it necessary to relinquish zones and go over to operations on axes, with strictly defined command authority and division of forces and means. It also became apparent, that effective destruction of the NATO naval forces in the Baltic Sea is a complex undertaking which cannot be fulfilled exclusively by the navy. It should be carried out using various means, including missile forces and artillery, the air army, and the aviation of the ground forces. This task, even though reflected to a certain degree in combat training practices (artillery fire at naval targets, and aviation missions carried out at sea) poses new requirements of an organizational-training nature, overlapping as well with the sphere of operational training. There is also a need for the navy to study the problems of supporting successive assault landing operations of front forces.

5. At the headquarters of the 2nd National Air Defense Corps, the exercise indicated the possibility of conducting combat operations by aviation and missile artillery beyond the boundries of the national territory, which would considerably increase the saturation of the front zone with antiaircraft defense weapons. The corps moved a considerable distance beyond the accepted outline of the ROENNE-SWINOUJSCIE line of responsibility while providing cover for the forces of the front and the navy. It is necessary, therefore, to draw a general conclusion from this experience, and to apply it to training exercises of the staffs of the other corps and the staff of the National Air Defense Forces. The possibility is also envisaged of conducting appropriate exercises with missile equipment, e.g., an experimental maneuver with "VOLKHOV" and "NEVA" missile battalions using sea transport.

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
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6. It was also confirmed that the conduct of assault landing operations continues to pose difficult and complicated problems. Despite repeated rehearsals of this subject, numerous problems await specific solutions, in particular, in the field of inter-allied standardization of operational concepts and the organization of command and support of combat operations. In the critique of exercise "FALA-77", the opinion was expressed that--regardless of the many positive aspects--much of the element of surprise is lost by launching an assault landing operation several days after the outbreak of hostilities. By then, the enemy is in position to strengthen antilanding defense, especially, to lay sea mines, of which he has a large supply, which can even lead to aborting an assault landing operation. Therefore, an assault landing should be planned in most minute detail, beforehand, during peacetime and implemented as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities. Marine mine depots should be located during peacetime, and, at the moment of initiation of combat operations, should immediately be destroyed. This type of mission, with designation of specific implementors, should be stipulated in advance in the plan of the assault landing operation. With regard to speed of the assault landing--even though the equivalent regiment landed in the scheduled number of waves in 35 minutes, which is in less time than the norm (40 minutes)--it is necessary to strive intensively for possibilities of accelerating the rate of embarking, sea transit, and landing. The view was advanced that a unified assault landing antiaircraft defense system should be created, the composition of which should include--in addition to naval and air army means--assigned forces and means of the National Air Defense Forces of the PPR and the GDR, with strictly defined tasks. It was very strongly emphasized that the organizer of an assault landing operation is the front commander himself. From the cited facts, the conclusion can be drawn, that it is necessary to undertake--on an interallied scale--appropriate studies leading to the establishment of a unified concept with regard to the organization and support of assault landing

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operations. Of immediate importance, however, is the further improvement of organizational forms of assault landing operations, paying attention to the competent selection of a maximum number of concealed embarkation points, the organization of embarkation, sea transit, and the assault landing. Particularly careful attention should be paid to the skillful organization of all types of support of assault landing combat operations. Also, a full set of calculation models should be worked out in order to facilitate planning of an assault landing operation. It was also necessary to issue medium scale maps with superimposed artillery grids of areas of probable assault landing operations.

7. In the problem area of transition to nuclear war, it is imperative for the staffs, to master the following skills:


- first--fully utilize conventional weapons during the prenuclear phase in order to inflict maximum possible losses on the enemy's nuclear capability (not all the nuclear targets can be and need to be destroyed by our own nuclear weapons);

- second--maintain a constantly updated plan for the first massed nuclear strike (the enemy can employ mass destruction weapons at any time, not necessarily in a situation critical for him);

- third--prepare a reliable plan for eliminating the results of employment of mass destruction weapons. It is necessary to continue the improvement of the organization of the work of staff groups planning the employment of nuclear weapons. It is also necessary to improve the competence to forecast the type of operations which will follow employment of nuclear weapons, teaching the staffs how to determine the combat capability of friendly and enemy forces--not only in percentile (quantitative), but primarily in qualitative indicators of losses (first of all, the question should be asked, what has been destroyed, for example, in a division, rather than the extent of total losses).

8. Conduct of combat operations on the northern strategic axis requires the necessity of capturing large cities, which, as a rule, are large industrial centers (e.g., HAMBURG), and are the seats of many military institutions. These objectives will be defended by many well armed and equipped forces. The organization of a battle for a city, in this case for HAMBURG and, particularly, designation of the necessary forces and their tasks still remain basic problems unresolved by our staffs. Also, crossing and utilization of the Kiel Canal, especially in the event of flooding the terrain along its course or blocking it by sunken ships, has proven to be an open question. This leads to the conclusion that undertaking appropriate studies and training measures on these matters is essential.

9. During the exercise, particularly great attention was paid to problems of command and coordination. Coalition command on the north-coastal and Jutland operational axis rests entirely in the hands of the front commander. The staff of the front should be, in particular, better prepared, organizationally and by training to direct the overall organization of an assault landing operation, including air-missile-artillery and antiaircraft support. Similar comments, even though on a somewhat smaller scale, pertain to the staff of the army assigned from the Pomeranian Military District, primarily, because of the anticipated nature of tasks performed along the sea coast. Furthermore, who should command the group of assault landing forces should be clearly established, because designating the chief of staff of the navy for that position must be considered a least proper, emergency solution. In this connection, the General Staff of the PAF will analyze the complex of command problems in the front elements and in the navy, using as a basis previous experience and all interrelations of the participants in an operation organized on the northern strategic axis. In training, however, it is necessary to stress the improvement of the proficiency of commanders in formulating correct decisions and of the staffs in efficiently




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preparing and assigning tasks to the troops. The principle should be instilled that decision making, issuing of orders and directives, and planning of combat operations is only the beginning and part of the task. Main organizational activity of commanders and staffs should be with the troops.

Within this context, the conclusion can be drawn that more informative staff training and all types of command-staff exercises should be conducted. Also, a study should be made of the form and number of the combat documents which are prepared and which, because of their time consuming content, are completed at the expense of time allocated for the organization of combat operations and the preparatory training of subordinate forces. To illustrate my point, let me mention that, for example, during exercise "FALA-77" the staff of the front had to submit to the exercise command, within 21 hours from the moment the directive was received, the following documents (everything in two copies, in Russian): the decision of the front commander to initiate an offensive operation (map with a legend), and the decision of the front commander to initiate an assault landing operation with attachments: plan for the assault landing operation; operational directive; planning table for coordination with a paratroop drop, tactical large units, and units of the rocket troops, fleet forces, air army, and with air defense troops of the Warsaw Pact countries; reconnaissance plan; anti-aircraft defense plan; rear services support plan; (during the presentation of the decision, an additional request was made for a plan to neutralize fortifications on the Danish Islands); and in addition to a plan for disembarking the assault landing forces, a decision to conduct combat operations on shore using the assault landing forces; a plan for preparing the amphibious landing forces for disembarking; a plan for embarking the assault forces; echelon assignment of the subunits, units, and cargo for assault landing; and, within the next 39 hours, a plan for offensive operation of the front with 15 attachments. For every shift in operational timing--and there were two--it was necessary, as a rule,

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to start the preparation of numerous operational documents from the beginning. Furthermore, on a daily basis, the front submitted to the directing body of the exercise eleven different accountings and reports, as well as all directives and orders issued to the troops during combat operations. In addition, the trainees were preparing themselves at the same time for almost daily oral presentations of their proposals (for this purpose, usually it was necessary to prepare additional maps and overlays). Therefore, it is necessary, at this time, to prepare--in coordination with the staff of the Combined Armed Forces--an inventory of necessary documentation to be prepared by specific command elements and then to prepare standard forms of combat documents. Even though certain staff elements have a number of formalized documents (e.g., the front has 17 forms of an operational nature and 10 for the rear services), it is necessary to standardize them further and put them into general use so that the time for planning combat operations and dissemination of information is shortened, and traffic over technical means of communications is reduced. Here also, collaboration of the staff of the Combined Armed Forces is essential.

It is necessary, likewise, to increase the degree to which commanders and staffs utilize special publications for planning combat operations, in particular, maps with an operational evaluation of the terrain, maps with seasonal passability conditions, relief maps, and terrain notes. Our annual allotment for production of this type of material, which is not fully utilized in the staff training process, is approximately 100 million zlotys.

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10. All the staffs devoted much effort to the preparation of various calculations and numerical tables. Those staffs demonstrated a discerning approach to the operational-tactical problems being resolved. Nevertheless, how to utilize statistical data for drawing specific conclusions which could be of help in the process of making decisions still remains a problem. We should also eliminate stereotyped style in reports to be submitted, which should be brief, and should only contain data needed by the commander in a specific situation (e.g., it is not always necessary to brief the commander on how many divisions he has, but rather on essential changes which have taken place in their combat effectiveness and the like). Attention of the staffs should also be called to the accuracy of the work when preparing combat documents. A separate problem is the preparation by the staffs of map-posters designed for display which are labor consuming and of little value to the process of directing the combat operations of the troops. However--it appears--that elimination of this undesirable phenomenon and reactivation of the skill of preparing working maps can take place only when we give up exaggerated ceremonial (showy) forms of receiving training reports. Other work styles for the leadership cadre should be sought which are closer to the realities of war, e.g., listening to reports at the reporting officers' places of work, surprise visits to the staffs participating in the exercises, or unexpected ordering of various personnel or groups to appear at the exercise headquarters to give briefings on the situation, and so forth.

The lack of knowledge of Russian language on the part of some of the staff officers was again painfully in evidence. In addition to other corrective measures being currently instituted, it is certainly high time to take energetic personnel action in cases where officers occupying TO&E positions calling for appropriate qualifications are not familiar with the language. While on this subject, it is not irrelevant to mention such a trivial problem as a lack

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in various headquarters of technical personnel and, particularly of typists qualified in Russian. Only with great difficulty and to a limited degree was it possible to obtain typists from the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense to assist the staffs. Since we are training our staffs for participation in a combined allied effort, we should appropriately reinforce some of the elements, particularly the staff of the front and the navy, with necessary auxiliary personnel capable of performing their duties in a qualified manner in the Russian language, which is the primary working language of the allied armies.

11. The exercises confirmed the correctness of the concepts of organizing and conducting radioelectronic warfare accepted in the PAF and demonstrated that the commanders and the staffs are prepared to implement them. Emphasis should be given in plans and decisions dealing with radioelectronic warfare to a comprehensive approach to this problem, which encompasses reconnaissance, physical destruction or neutralization of enemy radioelectronic means, defense of friendly radioelectronic systems, and countermeasures against enemy reconnaissance. Noteworthy is the jamming direction center introduced by the 8th Radio Jamming Regiment, which, in conjunction with the radioelectronic warfare direction center, forms a unified system enabling effective neutralization of selected enemy radioelectronic systems while maintaining the uninterrupted operation of friendly means. However, this system requires further improvement and outfitting with modern equipment which would permit making optimal decisions at critical moments of an operation and instantaneous reactions to the rapidly changing radioelectronic situation.

12. The exercise also confirmed the correctness of our basic assumptions regarding informatics support of the wartime command system. Nevertheless, it is necessary to increase the extent to which computer equipment is used by the staffs during the process of organizing combat operations.

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In this connection, there continues to exist the need-- in addition to broadening of the programming base and increasing the degree of its application--to improve the functioning of staffs and informatics specialists by the systematic employment of informatics methods and means in all operational-tactical and special exercises. We should also give consideration to creating positions for informatics organizers in operational sections of operational level staffs. The scope of application of informatics should be expanded to activities other than exercises in staffs at the operational and, subsequently, tactical level.

13. In the organization of material-technical support of an offensive operation, the problem of forces and means for administration of resources captured in the theater of operations requires consideration. Likewise, attention should be given to an analysis of the necessary forces and means for transloading supply reserves being transported in the relationship between front transportation brigades and army transportation units, and to the protection and defense of rear services units and installations. These problems, which, without a doubt, will be difficult to resolve in the immediate future, should be included in the armed forces development plans, at least in the long range plans.

14. With regard to technical matters, in our opinion, it is necessary to establish principles and policies on the level of the Combined Armed Forces staff for the development of means of supporting sea transit and the landing of assault forces (landing ships and cutters, means for eliminating antilanding barriers--including "minesweeping helicopters" [SMIGLOTALOWCE], hydrographic-navigational systems, etc.), and to begin their implementation at levels appropriate to the requirements of participation.

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In order to establish realistic conditions for supporting the maneuvering of aviation regiments of the air army, projects should be initiated which will provide a determination of capabilities to equip airfield construction battalions with the necessary number of light, dismountable runways to allow the rapid construction of airfields during offensive deployment of the front.


15. Matters regarding the development of the infrastructure of the theater of military operations (increasing the network of airfields, possible expansion of ports, roads, communications elements of the home front, etc.) were not officially discussed or defined in detail. Undertakings in this field are carried out by us on the basis of provisions contained in the "protocol on the assignment of PAF troops to the composition of the Combined Armed Forces and their deployment". We are complying with it thoroughly, closely relating defense requirements to national economic development.

16. Use was made during the exercise of a method of indicating the development of combat operations utilizing information prepared in advance, in minute detail on the planned course of combat operations which was disseminated comprehensively several times a day, usually every eight hours. This information was disseminated by small gaming teams, usually through the offices of the staffs taking part in the exercise. It appears that the above mentioned method will not lead to changes in gaming forms used by us in developing combat operations during major command post exercises. As is well known, we use gaming teams capable of furnishing information on the situation at anytime (provided we do not interfere with the communications system) and even of initiating substitute decisions and implementing them. This form ensures:

- first--a flow of information over realistically functioning means of communications, and indication of tasks by the same means;

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- greater freedom to influence the course of combat operations, in accordance with decisions of the exercise participants or immediate needs of the exercise command.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that both exercises presented an exceptional opportunity for improving the functioning of our staffs under new, more realistic conditions. The exercises allowed better definition of the place and the role of our command elements in a strategic operation in the theater of military operations. They were also helpful in drawing clearly signaled conclusions, the implementational procedure for which is presented in a plan proposed by the General Staff of the PAF.

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